It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.
If you think about that, you'll do things differently -Warren Buffett its consequences. 8 And one of these is that the reputation of those persons in positions of economic influence and authority will, by necessity, suffer. 9 The fallout from the financial crisis continues to inform the development of corporate and securities law, and the new regulatory landscape for economic activity within the United States is beginning to take form. 10 This evolutionary process, however, has been anything but stable or certain. 11 As might be expected, in concert with such momentous change in law and policy, recriminations for and associated investigations of past activity continue to affect competent regulators as well as market participants. 12 Nevertheless, while many of the underlying causes of the financial crisis are now better understood by both policy makers and scholars, the question remains-given where we were, where do we go from here?
While a definitive answer to such a question remains elusive, an additional perspective on the ethical issues of relevance to corporate and securities law may be helpful in considering the possible alternatives. 13 In particular, the ethical rules of corporate gatekeepers 14 in conflicts of interest scenarios is worthy of further consideration however, appear in their dreams as they try to resolve conflicts rustling around inside their heads.") 8 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Official Government Edition at *23 ("The economic impact of the crisis has been devastating. And the human devastation is continuing. The officially reported unemployment rate hovered at almost 10% in November 2010, but the underemployment rate, which includes those who have given up looking for work and part-time workers who would prefer to be working full-time, was above 17%. And the share of unemployed workers who have been out of work for more than six months was just above 40%.") . 11 See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1, at 59 n. 123; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 691, 694 (1992) .
12 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: ADDRESSING MISCONDUCT THAT LED TO OR AROSE FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfactions-fc.shtml (reporting key statistics through August 1, 2011 of 70 entities and individuals charged, and $1.65 billion in total penalties, disgorgement, and other monetary relief). 13 This article is the second in a series that explores the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 2. Specifically, the present discussion concerns the foundations in doctrine and theory that may apply to issues of conflicts of interest within the ambit of corporate and securities law. Accordingly, the subject matter for discussion includes both rules of the professions -or first-order ethical rules -and rules as may be prescribed by the competent authority -that is, second-order ethical rules. See infra Part II.D.
14 In concert with the ongoing scholarship of corporate gatekeepers, this article will adopt the definition of the corporate gatekeeper as enunciated by Professor John Coffee. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) (" [T] he gatekeeper is an agent who acts a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the 'signal' sent by the corporate issuer. The reputational intermediary does so by lending or 'pledging' its reputational capital to the corporation, thus enabling investors or the market to rely on the corporation's own disclosure or assurances where they otherwise might not.") This said, it is important to note that the term "gatekeeper" is a metaphor, and is not a description as such. Indeed, in cases where an in-house legal department hires the services of an independent firm on difficult legal disputes, the reputation of such an independent firm may include the ability-either real or imagined-of obtaining favorable results in questionable cases. Accordingly, in and discussion. 15 This article presents the argument that cases involving conflicts of interest in the corporate and securities law space may be viewed, as a matter of logic, as primarily calling into question the ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper. 16 In support of such an argument, Part II of this article sets forth a framework for conflicts of interest scenarios that takes into account four categories of legal rulesactivity rules, disclosure rules, liability rules and ethical rules. Specifically, the discussion of each of the categories of legal rules will proceed as follows: (i) for activity rules, the restrictions on services offered by auditors pursuant to Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; 17 (ii) for liability rules, the ongoing debate concerning whether aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b) 18 should be available to federal securities class action plaintiffs in light of the Court's decisions in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 19 and Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta; 20 (iii) for disclosure rules, proxy disclosure rules in relation to codes of ethics for senior financial officers 21 and compensation committee independence standards; 22 and (iv) for ethical rules, the relevant rules concerning conflicts of interest as provided in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 23 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 24 and the Attorney Conduct Rules. 25 In adopting such a framework, an ethical perspective will be elaborated to address matters within the ongoing development of corporate and securities law. 26 connection with the notion of the corporate gatekeeper as a reputational intermediary, the gatekeeper in question may also be viewed as an "usher." Here, the function of the "usher"-again, in a metaphorical sense-would be to ensure that that certain persons (or things) would proceed through the gate to their (or its) proper place, with only the most egregious cases being stopped in transit. In this sense, corporate attorneys often serve a function that more resembles that of the usher in that their incentives are often such that passing the gate (e.g., successfully closing a corporate transaction) is deemed the optimum of professional performance. I thank Professor Hazard for making these important observations. 15 The first article in this series explored the longstanding debate concerning the appropriate limits of the attorney-client privilege in connection with an internal corporate investigation. See Hines, supra note 1. In turn, this second article will explore the interplay of another core set of rules for legal ethics-that is, conflicts of interest rules. Although each of these articles should be considered as separate inquiries into the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics, the hope and intent is that applying these two important sets of rules of legal ethics (i.e., privilege and conflicts rules) to current developments in corporate and securities law will assist further research in such areas of scholarship. 16 Of note, the question of conflicts of interest necessarily implicates questions as to the independence of the corporate gatekeeper. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 1.7, Comment 1 (2011) ("Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.") As will be discussed in Part III.A.ii infra, the new rules on independence standards for Compensation Committees as part of the Dodd-Frank reforms provide an area where one may further explore the more practical application of the discussion provided herein. 17 26 Given the plethora of regulations that have been or will be promulgated by the SEC and other Part III of this article will discuss in greater detail the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper by first comparing the categories of conflicts rules as initially described in Part II. In making such a comparison, I will argue for an ethical perspective in instances where the corporate gatekeeper is an actor. 27 Further, I will suggest that such an ethical perspective may also engage with recent scholarly discourse regarding the theoretical approaches taken in each of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 28 As a means of further substantiating this line of reasoning, I propose in Part III certain revisions to disclosure rules concerning conflicts of interest policies for Compensation Committees as mandated by Dodd Frank, 29 and provide some concluding thoughts on the manner in which an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper may be more broadly considered as part of the ongoing development of corporate and securities law.
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II. CATEGORIES OF CONFLICTS RULES
The categorization of legal rules is a method of inquiry that facilitates further discussion of matters involving legal theory. 31 Of the mandatory rulemaking provisions, the SEC has proposed or adopted rules for about two-thirds of them."). 27 In arguing for the primacy of ethical rules in this instance, please note that this article does not argue for the relative unimportance of other categories of conflicts rules-i.e., activity rules, liability rules, and disclosure rules. Indeed, the federal securities regulatory scheme, properly considered, includes all of the categories of conflicts rules as discussed herein. Nevertheless, the argument made will be that, as a matter of logic, ethical rules should be of primary consideration because of their implications to the other categories of conflicts rules. Accordingly, the extent to which one may be able to determine the nature and quality of ethical rules may illuminate further discussion of activity rules, liability rules and disclosure rules as part of the ongoing scholarship in this area of law. 28 Barnes, ed. 1984) . 32 In respect of the categories set forth in this article, for instance, one might argue that the distinction between disclosure rules and liability rules is without difference, as a matter of practice. For does not the public company in the United States follow the particular disclosure rules of federal securities regulation in the shadow of its potential liability under the general anti-fraud liability rule? See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § § 229.10-1016 (2011); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2011). Indeed, much of this makes sense. Nevertheless, the intended purpose of this categorization is to argue in favor of the primacy of ethical rules within the context of corporate and securities law where the corporate gatekeeper is an actor. See supra note 27. ultimately lead to a negative thesis that the categorization itself is meaningless. 33 Nevertheless, any categorization should ultimately be assessed as to whether it facilitates inquiry into matters under consideration. 34 The question, therefore, is not whether the categories are true or correct in an absolute sense, but rather whether such categories inform the argument being presented. 35 Part II of this article presents one possible categorization of legal rules concerning conflicts of interest within the context of corporate and securities law. 36 Specifically, this part sets forth a framework for further discussion by first defining and then elaborating upon on four categories of conflicts rules-namely, activity rules, liability rules, disclosure rules and ethical rules.
37
A. Activity Rules
The first category of legal rules concerning conflicts of interest within the context of corporate and securities law is what one may call activity rules. 38 In this context, activity rules will be defined as rules of law that prescribe the permitted activity that the corporate gatekeeper may engage in as part of her professional representation of her chosen client.
39 Activity rules, therefore, are fundamentally negative rules in that they 33 This does not mean to imply, however, that any negative thesis is without merit as part of scholarly discussion. Indeed, a compelling critique of longstanding opinions and beliefs is often the first step toward more enlightened discussion of legal rules and their effects. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 210 (1979) ("[T]he activity of categorizing, analyzing, and explaining legal rules has a double motive. On the one hand, it is an effort to discover the conditions of social justice. On the other, it is an attempt to deny the truth of our painfully contradictory feelings about the actual state of relations between persons in our social world.") 34 See, e.g., Paul Studtmann, Aristotle's Categories, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/ (Sep. 7, 2007) ("The set of doctrines in the Categories, which I will henceforth call categorialism, provides the framework of inquiry for a wide variety of Aristotle's philosophical investigations, ranging from his discussions of time and change in the Physics, to the science of being qua being in the Metaphysics, and even extending to his rejection of Platonic ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics.") 35 property rule gives the holder of the right the legal power to prevent any other party from infringing on that right. A liability rule does not give the holder of the right the legal power to prevent another party from infringing, but instead gives the holder the right to obtain compensatory damages from the infringing party. In operational terms, courts typically enforce property rights through injunctive relief, whereas liability rules are typically enforced through monetary damages.") 37 See infra Parts II.B through II.E. 38 Admittedly, one could fashion a different taxonomy for the conflicts rules in question. For instance, conduct rules could be an alternative phrasing of the rules that I have in mind. As a means, however, of avoiding any confusion with the Attorney Conduct Rules, I adopt the term activity rules to provide the necessary distinction. 39 In respect of the corporate gatekeepers that are within the purview of this discussion, as a preliminary matter we may consider auditors, corporate attorneys, securities analysts and the rating agencies. See, e.g., prohibit certain activities that the corporate gatekeeper may undertake. 40 In this sense, activity rules can be viewed as the most stringent of conflicts rules because their mandate is (or at least should be) rather clear-you can do X, but you cannot do Y. 41 In many cases, however, activity rules will be even more straightforward-you cannot do X, Y and Z.
42 Accordingly, one would naturally be inclined to conclude that any activities that are not specifically prohibited by the given activity rule are permissible, provided that they are not otherwise prohibited by other activity rules. 43 Given this prohibited/permissible nature of activity rules, it is understandable that within the political process the possible enactment of activity rules will necessarily become a point at issue amongst competing interest groups. 44 For upon its enactment, the activity rule will delineate clear costs for those market actors who previously profited in the absence of such activity rules. 45 And, one presumes, such market actors will not accept the enactment of the activity rule without some measure of a political contest. As part of this enumerated list of prohibited activities, Section 201 notably prohibits the offering of services that may otherwise have been provided by a financial advisor or consultant. 52 And these specific activity rules were designed to address what -in the aftermath of the accounting scandals that preceded passage of Sarbanes Oxley -was perceived as a failing of the regulatory apparatus. 53 Namely, auditors did not pay close enough attention to their audits, 54 but became compromised by the allure of consulting firm will include a disclosure on the first page of each research report stating that it 'does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.'") 48 See Sarbanes-Oxley § 201. 49 For additional discussion regarding the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 22.1 (6th ed. 2009) ("From a long-term perspective, perhaps the most significant aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley is not the enhanced disclosure requirements or criminal penalties, but rather that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act goes further than any of the earlier federal securities laws and amendments in dealing directly with corporate governance-an area that had traditionally been reserved to the states.") 50 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) (permitting the rendering of tax services when such "activity is approved in advance by the audit committee of the issuer"). 51 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(1) through (9) (2011) (emphasis added). 52 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(7), (8 fees from their clients.
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As Professor John Coffee recounts in his important treatment on the subject, "the growth of consulting revenue as a proportion of accounting firms' overall revenues during the 1990s was dramatic…In short, consulting revenues more than doubled over this period and had come to exceed auditing revenues by a healthy 10 percent." 56 It is within this context that the economic effect of the activity rules, as set forth in Section 201, should be considered. 57 Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the accounting firms could engage in financial advisory and consulting services. After passage, they could not. 58 And the new activity rules -that is to say, the prohibitions on the enumerated services as set forth in Section 201 -came at the cost of lost business opportunities for the accounting firms.
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In this sense, activity rules can be viewed as a rather drastic (or Draconian, depending on one's perspective) form of rulemaking that seeks to curtail the activity in question. 60 In the realm of conflict of interest rules, therefore, activity rules are typically used to define-or more aptly stated, to re-define-the realm of conduct for the corporate gatekeeper. 61 Prior to the accounting scandals of Enron, Worldcom and the rest, the public auditor increasingly became to be seen as both auditor and consultant. When this fundamental tension between the auditor and consultant roles came to light, and with the fallout from the accounting fraud scandals become a matter of political interest, the necessary political will was achieved in order to push the activity rules through the Fastow's explanation of Enron's business did not exactly provide the promised clarity. On the contrary. Here's how Fastow explained Enron's business model: 'We create optionality. Enron is so much more valuable-hence our stock price-because we have so much more optionality embedded in our network than anyone else.'") 55 Although the available empirical scholarship on the effects of the rise of consulting fees is not dispositive, nevertheless the perception remains that the accounting industry changed in a fundamental manner. The problem, therefore, became one of culture and the often discussed "tone at the top." See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 14, at 151 ("In some cases, audit services may have been provided on such a discounted basis that auditing in effect became a 'loss leader.' Inherently, few things are more destructive to a watchdog culture that demands professional skepticism than to learn that is serves are so little valued as to be given away below cost.") 56 Coffee, supra note 14, at 147. As Professor Coffee notes, accounting and auditing revenue from all clients at the "Big Five" accounting firms stood at 53% in 1990, and thereafter declined to 34% in 1999. In contrast, consulting revenues at these same firms started at 20% in 1990 and rose to 40% by 1999. See id. 57 See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1 at 41 n.41. 58 Thus, these financial advisory and consulting services -those purported occasions of sin -are thrown into the bonfire. See supra note 4. 59 As a practical matter, this "bottom line" of the economic effect of activity rules is an important consideration as to whether the activity rule in question is efficient. political process. 62 Activity rules, therefore, are frequently enacted at moments of heightened political power, because in their effects they are inherently structural. 63 Given that such moments of political power are an infrequent occurrence, however, additional categories of conflicts rules must be considered.
B. Liability Rules
A second category of legal rules that addresses matters of conflicts of interest in corporate and securities law is the category of liability rules.
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Although the consideration of liability rules remains a foundational element of scholarly discourse, 65 for purposes of this discussion I will limit the definition of liability rules to those legal rules that attach liability to the actions (or lack thereof) of the corporate gatekeeper. 66 , and in the Senate on a 60-39 vote. See Dodd-Frank. Based solely on these numbers, the relative lack of political consensus in the case of Dodd-Frank suggests that the appetite for activity rules-for instance, in the form of the Volcker Rule-was not as prevalent as was the case with Sarbanes-Oxley. See supra note 46. 63 Although the structure or overall form of corporate law and its intersection with legal ethics merits additional inquiry, such matters will be reserved for the third article in this series. 64 Again, one could argue for a different taxonomy in relation to such legal rules. See supra note 38. However, given that the term liability rules is frequently used in the literature, I adopt such language for purposes of this discussion. This said, the question that necessarily arises with liability rules is who owes the liability to whom. Liability rules in this broader context, while certainly worthy of further discussion, are not what is intended for consideration in this article. Rather, in invoking the term liability rules, I speak to gatekeeper liability rules-that is, the legal rules that attach liability to the actions or inactions of the corporate gatekeeper. 65 See, e.g., Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 36, at 1110 ("[O]nce a liability rule is decided upon, perhaps for efficiency reasons, it is then employed to favor distributional goals as well.") 66 See supra note 64. 67 In public discourse, this question is often phrased-where were the gatekeepers? The implicit premise in posing such a question is that the gatekeepers were not there-a place they should have beenand therefore were in some manner absent or derelict in their duties. And one means of ensuring that the gatekeepers are appropriately engaged (as one may define) in the next case is to incentivize such behavior by enacting a liability rule. See, e.g., John C. Coffee 72 presumably your malfeasance will cause damage to your stockholders in the fashion of a depressed stock price. 73 Accordingly, existing law makes such executives liable to their shareholders in a state derivative suit 74 and also in a federal securities class action. 75 The instances in which such liability attaches are matters, therefore, that are further addressed in the relevant federal and state statutes and regulations, 76 as well as under applicable decisional law. 77 Thus, it is unsurprising to find that any possible changes to liability rules are points of contention that-in a manner similar to activity rules-will cause the political debate to be joined. 78 In such cases, the interest group that may classify as an aggrieved party would more naturally be in favor of the liability rule, while the potential compensating party will not for it will necessarily increase the cost of doing its business. 79 In this sense, liability rules present a struggle between two competing interest groups as to who should compensate for what and to whom. 80 An example of this extended contest that often surrounds liability rules is the longstanding debate regarding the availability of a private cause of action for aiding-and- in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business. Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.") (citation omitted) 74 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 327 (2011). 75 See Hazen, supra note 49, at § § 7.17, 12.15. 76 See id. at §1.2. 77 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) . 78 See supra note 44. 79 In connection with such increased costs, the question of a possible increase in agency costs remains an important area of inquiry. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 280 (1998) ("Law and economics scholars have used agency theory to analyze the client-lawyer relationship. Examples of lawyer conduct that have been traced to agency cost problems include misusing client confidential information for the lawyer's personal gain, favoring one client's interests over another's, and increasing or skewing the demand for legal services in ways that benefit the lawyer but not the client."); but see Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer As Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301 (1998) ("Lawyers are more than their client's agents. Lawyers are officers of the court, thus subjecting themselves to the court's supervision and to duties geared to protect the vigor, fairness, and integrity of processes of litigation. Furthermore, as members of a profession, lawyers are subject to duties not neatly captured by the consequences of agency.") 80 As a matter of practice, this would be more generally recognized as the somewhat unfortunate but all together common human behavior of pointing the finger at another. 83 Taken together, these cases provide the doctrinal context 84 in which one may further explore liability rules as a category for conflicts rules in the area of corporate and securities law. 
1) Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
The facts in Central Bank concerned certain bonds issued by the ColoradoSprings-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority in the amount of $26 million in order to "finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs."
86 Pursuant to the financing papers, Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for the bonds in question, which were secured by certain real estate interests. 87 As part of the financing, AmWest, the developer of Stetson Hills, covenanted to provide an annual report that such real estate interests had value of at least 160% of the outstanding principal and interest on the bonds. 88 In light of a decline in real estate values, Central Bank performed an in-house appraisal of the real estate interests in question. 89 The in-house appraisal determined that the stated values for such interests was "optimistic."
90 After exchanging letters with AmWest, Central Bank agreed to a delay of an independent review of the real estate appraisal, which permitted a second tranche of the bond issues to close. 91 In due time, however, the Colorado-Springs Stetson Hills Public Building Authority defaulted on this second tranche of bonds.
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In such circumstances, the question before the Court was whether Central Bank 81 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2011). 82 Central Bank, supra note 19. 83 Stoneridge, supra note 20. 84 Thus, while the particular facts of Central Bank and Stoneridge do not directly concern corporate gatekeepers as previously defined, nevertheless the doctrinal rules that result from such cases illustrate the nature and quality of liability rules in this context. 85 Although one could argue that Central Bank and Stoneridge are not cases that specifically or perhaps even necessarily implicate issues of conflicts of interest, please note that this category of liability rules, as defined, seeks to facilitate discussion of not only conflicts of interest rules, in and of themselves, but also the principles of independence that serve as the theoretical foundation for such rules. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 1.7, Comment 1, supra note 16. Accordingly, by fashioning this category of liability rules, I seek to further explore the manner in which conflicts rules, broadly considered, may be addressed within the space of corporate and securities law. 86 Central Bank, supra note 19, at 167. 87 See id. 88 See id. 89 See id. at 167-168. 90 Id. at 167. 91 See id. at 168. 92 See id.
was "secondarily liable under Section 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud." 93 In light of Central Bank's role as indenture trustee, the issue of secondary liability became a critical point of concern. In other words, Central Bank did not issue the bonds, but rather operated in a facilitating role per the terms of the indenture. 94 Accordingly, a claim for a primary violation of Section 10(b) by Central Bank would be difficult to substantiate. 95 But could investors in the bonds sue Central Bank on a theory of aiding and abetting liability?
The Court responded in the negative in a 5-4 decision. 96 In particular, the Court primarily relied upon the argument that Congressional intent was lacking in this instance. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that "there would be no logical stopping point to this line of reasoning" 97 of inferring private causes of action from the federal criminal statutory provision on aiding and abetting liability. Both the public and scholarly reaction to Central Bank was mixed at best. 98 Nevertheless, could an alternative theory of "scheme" liability prevail where the aiding and abetting liability claimed in Central Bank had failed?
2) Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta
In Stoneridge, investors in Charter Communications, Inc. filed suit against the company for falsely reporting financial information in order to meet Wall Street expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow. 99 In particular, the investors alleged that Charter Communications engaged in transactions of no economic substance (i.e., sham transactions) in order to create the appearance of increased revenues. 100 Indeed, the investors alleged that Scientific-America and Motorola, each of 93 Id. 94 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz and Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV, 1037, 1040 (2008) ("Absent default, the indenture trustee's duties to bondholders are straightforward and, indeed, even ministerial. In the event of default, however, those duties are governed by a 'prudent man' standard.") 95 As an elaboration, this would be so due to the fact that indenture trustees customarily do not actively engage in the marketing of bonds in a manner which would satisfy the requirement that such indenture trustee made a material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase and sale of the bonds. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
96 Central Bank, supra note 19, at 185 ("In sum, it is not plausible to interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit congressional intent to impose Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability.") 97 Id. 99 See Stoneridge, supra note 20, at 153. 100 See id. at 154 ("The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter to fool its whom were counterparties to contracts with Charter Communications, actively engaged in these sham transactions. 101 For instance, the investors alleged that Scientific-America falsely indicated an increase in its production costs, 102 while both Scientific-America and Motorola backdated certain advertising agreements in order to hide from the company's auditor that these transactions had no economic value. 103 Unlike the facts in Central Bank, therefore, the plaintiffs in Stoneridge appeared to have a stronger case against the secondary actors-in this case, the counterparties to contract, Scientific-America and Motorola. 104 However, the problem for the investors was that neither Scientific-America nor Motorola had misstated the financial information of Charter Communications. 105 The question, therefore, was whether the investors could impose "scheme liability" on Scientific-America and Motorola in the absence of either company making specific disclosure in respect of the relevant transactions.
106 Once again, the Court responded in the negative. 107 In particular, the Court held that the reliance requirement for a Section 10(b) action was not satisfied because "it was Charter, not [Scientific-America and Motorola], that misled its auditor and filed fraudulent financial statements; nothing [Scientific-America and Motorola] did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did." 108 When considered together, the Court's rulings in Central Bank and Stoneridge illustrate how difficult it is to define-or, once again, to redefine-the liability that attaches to secondary actors to the corporation. 109 And while both Central Bank and Stoneridge involved entities that are not typically considered as falling within the definition of the corporate gatekeeper, the liability rules set forth in each of these cases applies to each of the corporate attorney, auditor, securities analyst and ratings agency.
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It would appear, therefore, that liability rules are quite similar to activity rules in that they are rules enacted, in some sense, in a moment of political violence.
111 One side will prevail, and the other side will fail. 112 And to the winner go the spoils-that is, the auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers.") 101 See id. at 154-155. 102 See id. at 154. 103 See id. at 154-155. 104 See id. at 168-169 (Stevens, J., dissenting 113 In such circumstances, the possibility of enacting new activity rules and/or liability rules without the necessary political will appears remote at best. 114 Other categories of conflicts rules must therefore be discussed.
C. Disclosure Rules
The third category of legal rules on conflicts of interest in the context of corporate and securities law is the category of disclosure rules. 115 For purposes of this discussion, I will broadly define disclosure rules as those legal rules concerning the registration and reporting process for publicly traded companies under federal securities law and regulation.
116 Disclosure rules, therefore, are legal rules that are best captured in the famous remarks of Justice Brandeis, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."
117 As a matter of legal history, such an approach to securities regulation was the hallmark of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's thinking toward federal legislation in respect of such business activities.
118 Accordingly, in discussing disclosure rules, we concern ourselves with foundational rules of the federal securities regulatory regime. 119 , 2011 ) ("The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public.") governance, 120 the fact remains that the federal securities regulatory system is primarily a system that mandates and enforces disclosure rules.
121
As noted previously, the distinction between disclosure rules and liability rules has a tendency to blur in practice. 122 For purposes of this categorization, however, this distinction will be preserved in order to facilitate consideration of these different species of legal rules. 123 For instance, suppose that Corporation X discloses in its proxy statement that CEO Y will receive $50 million in aggregate compensation.
124 Suppose further that, in point of fact, CEO Y will receive $50 million and one cent in aggregate compensation. 125 In each case, the amount of aggregate compensation must be disclosed pursuant to a disclosure rule, as defined previously.
126 But is the difference in disclosed compensation-that is, the lonely cent that did not make it into the final draft for the printers-a matter that will also trigger a liability rule?
127 One thinks not, because the misstatement of one cent will probably not constitute a material misstatement of executive compensation for purposes of Section 10(b) liability. 128 Thus, while disclosure rules and liability rules are undoubtedly connectedindeed, they may be seen as two sides of the same coin under federal securities laws and regulation-the difference in their fundamental nature remains.
129 Disclosure rules mandate disclosure. Liability rules mandate liability. 130 And, therefore, disclosure rules, in and of themselves, should be further explored as part of this categorization. In particular, the proxy disclosure of codes of ethics for senior financial officers, 131 133 Although there are numerous examples of disclosure rules under federal securities law and regulation, I have selected the proxy disclosure related to codes of ethics for senior financial officers and the newly enacted compensation committee independence standards in that they provide us with useful examples of the intersection of corporate law with legal ethics. See supra note 13.
i. Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers
A first example of a disclosure rule, for purposes of this discussion, 134 is the requirement that codes of ethics must now be disclosed by companies that are subject to Regulation S-K. 135 Specifically, Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley mandated that the SEC issue rules to "require each issuer…to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar functions."
136 In response to this Congressional mandate, the SEC promulgated Item 406 of Regulation S-K that requires, inter alia, the disclosure of such a code of ethics. 137 Further, the SEC defined the term "code of ethics" as meaning:
[ But what information in respect of conflicts of interest is being disclosed by registrants pursuant to this disclosure rule? As further noted in this article, a review of recent proxy statements by Dow component companies provides us with some indication as to the disclosed information. 141 For present purposes, however, the category of disclosure rules begins to take form. Are there then other disclosure rules that we might consider as examples of the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics? 134 Again while this particular disclosure rule does not read to the corporate gatekeeper but to her client-here, the senior financial officers-nevertheless the illustration of this disclosure rule provides context for purposes of this categorization. 
ii. Compensation Committee Independence Standards
A second example of a disclosure rule that lies at the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics is the newly enacted independence standards for compensation committees and related proxy disclosure to such standards. 142 In particular, Section 952 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to issue by rule, or direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to promulgate such rules, whereby certain independence standards will apply for compensation committees. 143 Further, Section 952 requires the SEC to define by rule certain factors that may affect the "independence" 144 of the relevant compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser to a compensation committee of an issuer: Here, once again, we find a legal rule that touches upon both corporate law and legal ethics in its requirement that conflicts of interest policies and procedures must preserve the independence of the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser.
146
While this independence rule is not a disclosure rule as such, 147 Section 952 of DoddFrank later provides for the disclosure in corporate proxy materials of whether: "(A) the compensation committee of the issuer retained or obtained the advice of a compensation consultant; and (B) the work of the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if so, the nature of the conflict and how the conflict is being addressed."
148
Here, therefore, is an additional disclosure rule that implicates matters of both corporate law and legal ethics.
As of the time of the drafting of this article, the SEC has issued a proposed rule pursuant to the mandates of Section 952. , 2011 ), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-57.pdf ("We do not believe that it is appropriate for the Commission to expand the Section 10C(c)2 disclosure requirement to cover both actual and potential conflicts of interest."); Letter from Professor Robert J. Jackson, Jr. to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at *4 (May 19, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-52.pdf ("While the exact design of the disclosure is beyond the scope of these preliminary comments, companies should at least be required to disclose which attorneys advised the compensation committee on executive pay-and any potential conflict of interest these lawyers may face.") 151 Although this category of ethical rules undoubtedly and perhaps even necessarily touches upon the prior categories of activity rules, liability rules and disclosure rules, I believe that there is merit in distinguishing ethical rules from these other categories for reasons that will be made clear. See infra Part III.A 152 Indeed, the definition of one's "ethics" may be viewed as the normative act itself. For once certain behavior or other relevant thought or action becomes by definition unethical, then by necessity it will not be ethical. In this sense, the categorization of an ethics brings substance to the form. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210. 153 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L. J. 448, 453 (1995) ("By 'ethics,' I mean norms shared by a group on a basis of mutual and usually reciprocal recognition. Ethics, as thus defined, is essentially a two-party transaction…The term 'ethics' comes to us from the Greek ethikos, a word which signified a custom or usage. Thus, the term refers to a norm having the characteristic of being understood in a community…[E]thics entails a dimension of outward manifestation resulting in communication within the relevant community and a dimension of historical sequence through which an idea manifested at one point is remembered at a subsequent period.") 154 In answering such a question, of course, lies the fundamental distinction between natural law and legal positivist approaches to law. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT, RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 1-10, 74-80 (2d ed. 2002). 155 See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, "…IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) ("'Professionalism' is an elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard to pin down. That is perhaps as it should be. The term has a rich, long-standing heritage, and any single definition runs the risk of being too confining.") Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and Professional Ethics, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 134 (1992) ("The term 'professional ethics' can be understood to refer to at least three different but related normative sources: first, the profession's rules of ethics; second, ethical tradition including professional myths, lore and narrative; and third, the standards of conduct that an observing anthropologist would describe as the profession's conventions of actual practice. The last source may also be captured by the term 'habit' which at one time was used to describe a group's regular pattern of conduct.") more tellingly what do we not mean? 156 As a means of facilitating further discussion on such points, this article seeks to adopt a more neutral phraseology in relation to these fundamental questions. 157 Thus, I employ the term ethical rule as a conscious effort to provide common language that may be utilized when forming arguments from numerous perspectives on law. 158 Further, I make the initial distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules, as a matter of logic. 159 In this respect, the intention is once again to provide such language that may be useful in furthering scholarly discussion on such points. 160 But before turning to the distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules, it may be helpful to more fully enunciate the meaning of the term ethical rule as used for the purposes of the present discussion.
The more frequently used phrase in modern discourse is the word professionalism or professional ethics. 161 But what does this mean? As Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Deborah Rhode explain, "'Profession' comes from the Latin, professionem, meaning to make a public declaration. The term evolved to describe occupations that required new entrants to take an oath professing their dedication to the ideals and practices associated with a learned calling."
162 While the origins of the term profession may be clear, however, the manner in such it is employed has not been entirely consistent over time. 163 Nevertheless, a consistency in the usage of the term professional or its variants (i.e., professionalism, professional ethics) is, in some fashion, an effort to achieve greater virtue on the part of the profession in question.
164 156 See supra note 152. Definition is, therefore, a decision-that is to say, a decision as to the precise ambit of the ethics under consideration. This said, the interpretation of such definitions is a matter without the scope of inquiry in this article. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 123-156 (2011). 157 Without doubt, alternative terms may be used by those with a contrary perspective to the conclusions that I draw in this article. Nevertheless, the intention is to make the language employed as neutral as may be possible, given the inherent limitations of the written word. Accordingly, one may view this taxonomy as placeholders of sorts for the concepts that are being explored in developing the lines of argumentation as set forth herein. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. BISHIN, CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD, v (1972) ("[E]very legal problem-whether it concern the 'great issues' of civil disobedience or the hum-drum matters of Offer and Acceptance and Last Clear Chance-has its roots and perhaps its analog in traditionally 'philosophical' realms. Strip away the technical terms, plumb the debate's assumptions, and a host of implicit philosophical positions will be found.") 158 See generally id. at 403. 159 See infra Parts II.D.i and II.D.ii. 160 Without some measure of agreement as to the language being employed, one imagines that further discussion as to areas of disagreement cannot be fully explored. We must, therefore, first agree on the language being used prior to any disagreement as to subsequent argumentation. See supra note 157. 161 See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 11, at 691-692 (1992) ("In the most recent decade, the call [to 'do the right thing'] has been expressed in terms of 'professionalism.' In earlier years, the call was expressed as a demand that lawyers dedicate themselves to 'serving the public interest' and in Victorian times it was expressed in terms of the 'honor of the legal profession.'") 162 Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of "profession" is found in Professor Wasserstrom's influential article on the subject matter. 165 Given its importance within the scholarship, it may be helpful to quote at length:
Because of the significance for my analysis of the closely related concepts of a profession and professional, it will be helpful to indicate at the outset what I take to be the central features of a profession…There are, I think, at least six that are worth noting. (1) The professions require a substantial period of formal education-at least as much if not more than that required by any other occupation.
(2) The professions require the comprehension of a substantial amount of theoretical knowledge and the utilization of a substantial amount of intellectual ability... physical health, psychic well-being, liberty, and the like. As a result, persons who seek the services of a professional are often in a state of appreciable concern, if not vulnerability, when they do so. (6) The professions almost always involve at their core a significant inter-personal relationship between the professional, on the one hand, and the person who is thought to require the professional's services: the patient or the client. 166 Professions, therefore, are an elite of sorts within society with certain prescribed privileges and responsibilities that are obtained upon the completion of rigorous academic training and achievement. 167 In respect of the legal profession, as Tocqueville famously observed, "Hidden at the bottom of the souls of lawyers one therefore finds a part of the tastes and habits of aristocracy. They have its instinctive penchant for order, its natural love of forms; they conceive its great disgust for the actions of the multitude and secretly scorn the government of the people." 168 This notion of the professional as a class that is separate and distinct from others 165 Hazard , supra note 28, at 1272 ("It is important to contrast Tocqueville's view of aristocracy with what seems to be a widely shared contemporary misinterpretation of that concept. In present-day American usage, 'aristocracy' signifies a class constituted by inheritance, endowed with unearned wealth and income, and privilege to remain in idleness. Its members enjoy their status by an accident of history and interject themselves in serious matters only occasionally and then merely as a matter of personal choice. This concept of an aristocracy calls up images of the English country house dilettantes of the Victorian era…Yet Tocqueville assumes that an 'aristocratic element' must exist even in a democracy, and finds it in the legal profession and in 'those who have turned to industry.' In Jeffersonian terms-perhaps compatible with democratic ideology-members of the legal profession would be a 'natural aristocracy,' as distinct from an inherited one.") in society is a reality that is often at odds with fundamental principles of American culture. 169 Such tension between the necessity for professions within the greater political economy and the tendencies of an anti-establishment culture often leads to most natural of results-professionals, and lawyers in particular, are not exceedingly popular in the United States. 170 But such cultural phenomena aside, the reality remains that the task must be completed-and, therefore, the professions must seek to complete their appointed task.
171
One of the most important tasks of the professions is their self-regulation.
172
While reasonable minds may disagree as to whether such an approach is natural or whether alternatives may be desired, 173 this is the current state of affairs of the professions at the present time. 174 This article, therefore, addresses the professions in their current 169 See, e.g., U.S. Const. preamble ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."); Hazard, supra note 28, at 1241 ("The bar's ambiguous standards of competence, for example, can be attributed to such external realities as the wide variety of constituencies seeking legal services, the diversity of aspirants for legal careers, and-above allfundamental tendencies in the American social environment: its unacknowledged social stratification, disdain for elitism, and aversion to regulatory controls on personal behavior.") 170 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 380 (1987) ("Lawyers, it seems, can't win for trying. They are simultaneously praised and blamed for the very same actions."); Hazard, supra note 11, at 701 ("I submit that the opprobrium is essentially what psychiatrists call 'projection.'…The lawyer's vocation is living testimony to the discrepancy between the community's ethical aspirations and its merely human condition. It may also be that the availability of lawyers to deal with some of these discrepancies permits other members of the community to imagine themselves above such unpleasantness and allows them to live in an imaginary world.") This said, the interrelationship of the professions with greater society need not always be this strained. For instance, in Japan the notion that there is a legal elite is an accepted reality for the larger society in question. . But what one culture may accept, another may freely deny as a matter of choice or, more likely, historical path dependence. And therein lies the difference for the professions when properly considering their ethical rules within the fabric of larger social discourse. Or, to put the question plainly, to which culture are you fashioning the ethical rule? See, e.g., Hazard and Dondi, supra note 139, at 2 ("Every legal system has a distinct cultural character, and there is much variance in legal systems even among the Western regimes."); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 38 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990) ("In order to understand a culture, one must employ the same faculties of sympathetic insight with which we understand one another, without which there is neither love nor friendship, nor true human relationships.") 171 See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 165, at 1 n.1. Here, Professor Wasserstrom's observations ring true that "the professions are almost always involved with matters which from time to time are among the greatest personal concerns that humans have: physical health, psychic well-being, liberty, and the like." Id. Some measure of opprobrium is, one must imagine, a small price to pay in the face of such important responsibilities. See 177 In taking such an approach, the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics will be further explored. 178 And as a means to further such lines of inquiry, the initial distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules becomes necessary.
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i.
First-Order Ethical Rules
A first-order ethical rule is, for purposes of this discussion, a rule of ethics as may be prescribed by the relevant profession.
180 Accordingly, the first-order ethical rule is an ethical rule of the first-order precisely because it is enunciated by the relevant profession as matter of self-regulation. 181 Again, while reasonable minds may disagree as to whether first-order ethical rules should be promulgated in the current fashion or whether alternatives may be desirable, 182 nevertheless the reality remains that first-order ethical rules do exist for the professional qua gatekeeper. 183 More specifically, the first-order ethical rules for corporate attorneys are those model rules of legal ethics as drafted by the American Bar Association ("ABA"), 184 and as further enunciated and enforced by the bar profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of selfgovernment, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.") 175 This said, I do not intend to provide a purely descriptive argument, but also include some possible prescriptions in federal securities law and regulation. See infra Part III.A.ii. 176 See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 165, at 21 ("The lawyer qua professional is, of necessity, only centrally interested in that part of the client that lies within his or her special competency.") 177 180 In using the phrase first-order ethical rule, I do not mean to suggest that such rules are necessarily more important or in some fashion superior to what will later be described as a second-order ethical rule. The effort, once again, is to provide a taxonomy of ethical rules that will facilitate further discussion. Indeed, the distinction between a first-order ethical rule and second-order ethical should be considered as primarily one of logic. See, e.g., Herbert B. Enderton, Second-order and Higher-order Logic, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-higher-order/ (Mar. 4, 2009) ("Second-order logic is an extension of first-order logic where, in addition to quantifiers such as 'for every object (in the universe of discourse,)' one has quantifiers such as 'for every property of objects (in the universe of discourse).' This augmentation of the language increases its expressive strength, without adding new non-logical symbols, such as new predicate symbols. For classical extensional logic (as in this entry), properties can be identified with sets, so that second-order logic provides us with the quantifier 'for every set of objects.'") (emphasis in original). 181 See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, ¶ 10; Wasserstrom, supra note 165, at 1 n.1. 182 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 173, at 1316. 183 See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Scope, ¶ 19 ("Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.") 184 See, e.g., Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canons 5 and 9; Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct associations and courts in the various states. 185 It is, therefore, the ABA rules on the ethics of the legal profession and the historical development thereof that become the focus of this discussion.
186
As a matter of legal history, it may be helpful to first recall the precise manner in which the self-regulation of attorneys commenced in the United States. 187 Although the antecedents of the professional regulation of attorneys read back to the Nineteenth Century in the United States, 188 and even as far back as the Thirteenth Century in England, 189 the first comprehensive ethical "code" 190 for attorneys in the United States comes with the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 191 The impetus for such codification of ethical rules came from a speech by President Theodore Roosevelt given in 1905, where he made the following observation:
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical contempt for those prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning he can escape or evade is a menace to our community; and the community is not to be excused if it does not develop a spirit which actively frowns on and discountenances him. The great profession of the law should be that profession whose members ought to take the lead in the creation of just such a spirit. We all know that, as things actually are, many of the most influential and most highly remunerated members of the bar in every centre of wealth make it their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of great wealth.
192
In response to this call for action, the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908. 193 In comparison to the current rules of professional ethics, however, the Canons of Professional Ethics is a document of its time in that it may read to modern eyes as somewhat antiquated. 194 Nevertheless, the Rubicon had been crossed in that there now existed a formal ethical code for attorneys in the United States. 195 And while the specific rule on conflicts of interest was rather terse, 196 it did provide the beginnings for the further development of first-order ethical rules in the form of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
1) Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969, the ABA enacted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which constituted a significant revision-indeed, perhaps one can even say a redrafting-of the first-order ethical rules for attorneys in the United States. 198 Notably, the Model Code reorganized the rules in question into a three-fold structure: canons, ethical considerations and disciplinary rules. 199 The canons continued to provide general direction to attorneys, 200 while the ethical considerations provided aspirational rules. 201 Further, the disciplinary rules 202 provided the first step in what Professor Hazard calls the "legalization" process of the norms of professional conduct. 203 through the vehicle of the canons and, more specifically, the ethical considerations. 205 And the reasons for this division between the aspirational and the mandatory, as Professor David Luban explains in his important work on the subject matter, 206 was in part due to the scholarship of Professor Lon Fuller. 207 In this sense, therefore, the ethical considerations provide a means by which one may explore the "inner morality" of a profession that an otherwise mandatory rule may not achieve.
208 Accordingly, the Model Code presents us with this bifurcated approach to first-order ethical rules-those that are aspirational, and those that are mandatory.
209
Of particular note for the present discussion on conflicts of interest, the Model Code provides under the rubric of an Ethical Consideration a rule on the appearance of impropriety, which may be helpful to consider at length:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts and the judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession, one dedicated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers in supporting the organized bar through the devoting of his time, efforts, and financial support as his professional standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. 208 See Luban, supra note 206, at 807 ("One knows a priori, so to speak, how a Fullerian analysis of legal ethics should run. There should be an outer morality concerned with the content of legal representations, and perhaps with issues such as a lawyer's honesty. But the interesting part of the analysis would be an effort to discover an inner morality of the legal profession, that is, a morality that makes law practice possible. The inner morality, professional ethics in the proper sense of the term, would consist of functional virtues and duties.") (emphasis added). 209 See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Preliminary Statement. 210 Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Ethical Consideration 9-6 (emphasis added). 211 See id. Preliminary Statement. 212 See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Disciplinary Rules 5-102 through 5-107.
well as the possibility of an appearance of impropriety in the given case. 213 Such an approach evolved, however, under the present formulation of first-order ethical rules for the legal profession-that is, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
2) Model Rules of Professional Conduct
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which remain the primary source of first-order ethical rules for attorneys in the United States. 215 In their formulation, the Model Rules had the intended purpose of "legalizing" the rules of legal ethics. 216 In this sense, therefore, the Model Rules completed the task that began with the Model Code-that is, a concerted effort to remove the rules of legal ethics from the vestiges of canonical prose, or the language of professional scripture. 217 Such a development as a matter of law and practice, while perhaps not inevitable in a strict sense, 218 was nevertheless an improvement in the self-regulation of the legal profession. 219 In lieu of what may be considered as rather vague notions of "ethics" and "professionalism" that arguably obtained under the Model Code and certainly were set forth in the 1908 Canons, the Model Rules brought clarity and focus to the regulation of attorneys as a profession.
220
And what this meant, more specifically, is that vague notions of "ethics" and "professionalism" were no longer the criteria upon which one would determine whether particular conduct by an attorney is permissible or not.
221
As an indication of such changes in the approach to self-regulation, one may consider the manner in which the Model Rules addressed the issue of an "appearance of impropriety" in comparison to the approach taken under the Model Code, as discussed previously. 222 In keeping with the aim of legalizing the rules of legal ethics, the Model Rules took the direct approach in that they discard the ethical consideration of an appearance of impropriety from the conflict of interest rules. 223 The reasons for such an approach are persuasively explained in the commentary to the Model Rules:
The other rubric formerly used for dealing with disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety 213 See id. at Ethical Consideration 9-6; infra Part III.A. 214 See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities; Scope. 215 See id. 216 See Hazard, supra note 28, at 1241 ("[O]ver the last twenty-five years or so the traditional norms have undergone important changes. One important development is that those norms have become 'legalized.' The rules of ethics have ceased to be internal to the profession; they have instead become a code of public law enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary process.") 217 See id. 218 See Luban and Millemann, supra note 28, at 46 ("Geoffrey Hazard's views of the transformation are particularly significant, because, as the Kutak Commission's reporter who drafted the Model Rules, he occupies the dual role of chronicler and prime mover of the final stage of the transition.") 219 See Hazard, supra note 28, at 1249 ("What were fraternal norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been transformed into a body of judicially enforced regulations.") 220 See id. 221 See, e.g., Luban and Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47. 222 See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Ethical Consideration 9-6, supra Part II.D.i.(1). 223 See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rules 1.7 through 1.13.
can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of impropriety" is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved either by simply analogy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety.
224
Accordingly, the "appearance of impropriety" criterion is subject to compelling criticism in that it makes the test a subjective one where the opinion of a former client will, more often than not, be decisive. 225 And if the effort behind the Model Rules is to legalize legal ethics, then the appearance of impropriety test cannot remain in the manner set forth in the Model Code. 226 To be sure, the assessment on such points will necessarily change when considering the important issues that concern conflict of interest scenarios for judges. 227 But as a general rule for the practicing attorney, the criterion necessarily needs revision in order to move the test from a subjective to an objective one. 228 As a consequence, the Model Rules in a certain sense reified the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code. 229 This, then, is the current state of affairs of the first-order ethical rules for the legal profession.
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ii.
Second-Order Ethical Rules
In contrast to first-order ethical rules, for purposes of this discussion a secondorder ethical rule shall be defined as a rule of ethics as may be prescribed by the competent authority. 231 In this sense, the distinction between first-order and second-order ethical rules is primarily one of the rule-giver. 232 In the case of first-order ethical rules, the relevant profession provides the ethical rules as a matter of self-regulation. 233 As for second-order ethical rules, a competent authority in some sense imposes rules of legal ethics onto the profession. 234 The difference, therefore, is largely one of governance. 235 For in respect of first-order ethical rules, the professions to some extent decide upon those ethical rules that will bind the professions in question. 236 First-order ethical rules, therefore, can be seen as an effort by the professions to tie themselves to the mast, in a manner of speaking, when approaching the Sirens. 237 On the other hand, second-order ethical rules are, by their very nature, imposed on the professions. 238 And while the professions may or may not consent to such an imposition of ethical rules, the critical distinction is that while such consent may be desired, it is by no means necessary. 239 The occurrence of second-order ethical rules for the professions has particular salience for the corporate attorney. 240 Indeed, it is in the case of the corporate attorney that we find in sharp relief the distinction between first-order ethical rules and secondorder rules.
241 Accordingly, in considering the manner in which corporate attorneys concern themselves with second-order ethical rules, one may further explore the precise manner in which such rules may operate. 242 And the most notable example of secondorder ethical rules for the corporate attorney remains, by general consensus, the Attorney Conduct Rules as enacted pursuant to the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
1) Attorney Conduct Rules
Although the Attorney Conduct Rules are a matter deserving of extended discussion, for purposes of this categorization an overview of the notable provisions of such rules will be sufficient. 244 Adopted by the SEC in 2003 pursuant to Section 307 of 251 Rather, the Attorney Conduct Rules are more closely related to the Model Rules in that they seek to provide minimum standards of professional conduct that will apply in the case of an attorney that is appearing and practicing before the Commission.
252
In particular, the Attorney Conduct Rules set forth the now famous "up the ladder" reporting requirements for covered attorneys that become aware of "evidence of a material violation" 253 by their corporate client. 254 Importantly, the Attorney Conduct Rules provide that this duty to report evidence of a material violation is mandatory and thus is not a matter of personal discretion. 255 Further, the duty to report evidence of a material violation remains mandatory in the case that the attorney in question "reasonably believes"
256 that the chief legal officer or chief executive officer has not provided an place in connection with the passage of Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the regulations promulgated thereunder, see Coffee, supra note 14, at 216-223; Hazen, supra note 49, at § 9.8; Koniak, supra note 98, at 1269-1278. 245 See Sarbanes-Oxley § 307. 246 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003) . "These standards supplement applicable standards of any jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not intended to limit the ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not inconsistent with the application of this part. Where the standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part, this shall govern." Id. 247 Id. at § 205.2(a). Notably, this defined term of "appearing and practicing before the Commission" does not include a "non-appearing foreign attorney." Id. at § 205.2(a)(2)(ii). In turn, the phrase "nonappearing foreign attorney" has its own defined term. 256 See id. at § 205.2(m) ("Reasonably believes means that an attorney believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is not unreasonable."); see also id. at § 205.2(l) ("Reasonable or reasonably denotes, with respect to the actions of an attorney, conduct that would not be unreasonable for a prudent and competent attorney.") "appropriate response" 257 to such evidence of material violation. In such cases, therefore, the attorney must report such evidence of material violation to the board of directors, the audit committee or another uninterested committee of the board of directors in order to satisfy her duties under the Attorney Conduct Rules. 258 Alternatively, the attorney may be subject to a separate reporting procedure in cases where there is a "qualified legal compliance committee." 259 In either case, however, the Attorney Conduct rules provide mandatory rules of professional conduct that operate in the fashion of second-order ethical rules.
260
Of note, the Attorney Conduct Rules specifically provide that they do not create a private right of action.
261 Nevertheless, the Attorney Conduct Rules do provide that a violation thereof will subject an attorney to civil penalties and remedies that apply in the case of a violation of federal securities laws. 262 As one might imagine, therefore, attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission must carefully consider their responsibilities under both first-order and second-order ethical rules. 263 Such considerations are without the scope of the inquiry as set forth in this article. 264 For the purposes of the present categorization, however, the nature and extent of ethical rules becomes clear-in both their first-order and second-order formulations.
III. THE PRIMACY OF ETHICAL RULES OF THE CORPORATE GATEKEEPER
With this categorization of conflicts of interest rules now complete, the discussion may now turn to the argument in favor of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper, as a matter of logic.
265 This argument will be made in two-parts: (a) by comparing the previously defined categories of conflicts rules, 266 and (b) by arguing for an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper. 257 See id. at § 205.2(b) (enumerated definition of what constitutes an "appropriate response"). 258 See id. at § 205.3(b)(3). 259 See id. at § 205.3(c). 260 See id. at § 205.3(b) and (c). 261 See id. at § 205.7(a). Additionally, the final rules promulgated by the Commission did not include the controversial "noisy withdrawal" provisions that were included in the proposed rule. The notion of reputation as an important factor in an approach to law is not without precedent. 268 Indeed, the inclusion of reputation in the form of reputational capital as part of legal theory has a long history within the law and economics school of legal thought, 269 which informs to a considerable degree the important work in the area of gatekeeper scholarship. 270 Further, the application of reputation as a more specific criterion upon which to assess law has been explored in such varied areas of law such as international law, 271 corporate law 272 and international financial law. 273 And while the usage of this term no doubt strongly suggests that important issues of law and policy are raised when invoking such language, the initial question that must be asked is-what do we mean when we speak of reputation?
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A. Ethical Rules and the Corporate Gatekeeper
Perhaps a useful manner in which to begin to answer this question is in considering the word itself. 274 What, then, is reputation? As a matter of etymology, the word "reputation" derives from the Latin reputatio, which means "the action of thinking about, consideration; a subject of thought, reflection." reputation may properly be considered as a term that connotes some manner of introspection. 276 And while the modern usage of the word reputation is more typically associated with one's regard within a community, 277 this ancient and perhaps more precise definition of reputation has resonance in the ethical context. For, in the words of Warren Buffett, if you think about your reputation as something that takes 20 years to build and five minutes to ruin, you'll do things differently. 278 With this definition of reputation in mind, we may now turn to the comparison of the categories of conflicts as has been set forth in the preceding pages of this article. 279 i.
Comparison of the Categories of Conflicts Rules
As a means of further developing the notion-as a matter of logic-of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper, it will be helpful to consider the manner in which the previously defined categories of conflicts rules interrelate. 280 More specifically, a comparison of the categories of conflicts rules in respect of the positive and negative interests at issue for each of the professional qua gatekeeper and the corporate client itself will be instructive. 281 For when considering conflicts rules, the tension often lies with the respective responsibilities assumed by the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client. 282 One might imagine an instance where the corporate client may wish to engage in certain illegal and perhaps even immoral conduct, 283 but the professional qua gatekeeper must intervene as a matter of professional ethics. 284 Cases of conflict of interest, therefore, are necessarily-in a phrase-conflicted. And they are conflicted precisely in the sense that the interest of one party is set against another's. order ethical rules. 286 But what does this import when comparing the various species of conflicts rules? Are some conflicts rules more properly designed to address certain issues in law and policy than others? And if so, what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each of these species of conflicts rules? 287 In attempting to answer such questions, the rule maker will need to consider, at least to some degree, the precise manner of rule that will be employed. 288 The rule maker, in this sense, must know what rules she is writing. 289 And if this is indeed the case, then a categorization of conflicts rules will provide some structure through which the decision as to the particular rule that will be employed can be made. 290 Here, therefore, is the intended purpose of the aforementioned categorization of conflicts rules.
But prior to a specific consideration of each of the aforementioned categories, it may be helpful to first compare the positive and negative interests of each of the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client. 291 For the purpose of such a comparison, I will adopt a broad notion of "interest" for each of the parties in question. 292 Thus, for the professional qua gatekeeper, the positive interest will be defined as matters that fall within the self interest of such gatekeeper as a member of her chosen profession. 293 The negative interest for such gatekeeper, therefore, will be the logical opposite-matters that fall without the self interest of such gatekeeper as a member of her chosen profession. 294 Further to such descriptions, the positive interest of the corporate client will be defined as matters that fall within the self interest of the corporate enterprise, broadly considered. In turn, the negative interest of the corporate client will also be the logical opposite-that is to say, those matters that fall without the self interest of the corporate enterprise, again in the broadest sense. 295 Here, the effort remains to provide both the reader and the author with a common language with which to engage in discussion. 296 And while there may be other terms that would be seen as more attractive to the particular reader, I ask that such reader take this proffered terminology in light of its intended purpose. 297 I will note, however, that in using the term "self interest" that I do not mean to imply that such interests be considered in the narrow sense. By this I mean that when invoking such language that I am not making a particular claim for a normative ethical position. 298 Rather, I seek to use the term "self interest" in a more specific sense-that is, the specific sense to the professional as a member of her chosen profession.
299 Accordingly, the self interest in question is not solely a personal one. Indeed, when considered as such, the self interest in question is the interest of the profession itself as may be channeled through the particular professional under consideration. 300 And the reason, I will argue, that this is a preferred approach to consider interests of the profession is that this is how-one must imagine-professional ethics actually works.
301 This is to say, while the first-order and second-order ethical rules provide guidance, in the final analysis the ethical decision remains an individual one. 302 And thus the ethical choice for the professional qua gatekeeper is to consider her ethical duties and responsibilities as a member of her chosen profession.
When considering the positive and negative interests of each of the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client as such, the following description emerges: 297 See supra note 27. 298 See, e.g., WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 15 (second ed., 1973) ("Ethical egoism holds that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good-that an act or rule of action is right if and only if it promotes at least as great a balance of good over evil for him in the long run as any alternative would, and wrong if it does not.") (emphasis in original). 299 See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities ¶ 1 ("A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.") 300 Cf. Fuller supra note 207, at 802 ("One who wishes to communicate his thoughts to others must force the raw material of meaning into defined and recognizable channels; he must reduce the fleeting entities of wordless thought to the patterns of conventional speech.") 301 See, e.g., Regan, supra note 240, at 214 ("[T]he transformative character of corporate enterprise virtually guarantees that corporate lawyers perpetually will be facing dilemmas for which our existing professional responsibility framework provides imperfect guidance.") 302 See id. 
CORPORATION
In every case, therefore, there will be four possible outcomes. 303 There may be instances where the conflict rule in question can be seen as reading to the negative interest of the gatekeeper and the negative interest of the corporation. This "double negative" circumstance is illustrated in the upper left quadrant of the matrix. 304 Alternatively, the conflict rule may remain in the gatekeeper's negative interest but may more properly be viewed as in the corporation's positive interest. Here, then, is the upper right quadrant. 305 But, of course, the "mixed" interest circumstance can turn on its head, whereby the conflict rule reads to the gatekeeper's positive interest and the corporation's negative interest. This will be the lower left quadrant of the matrix. 306 And, finally, there will be those instances where the conflict rule in question reads to the positive interest of both the gatekeeper and the corporation. This is the lower right quadrant. 307 But this may all be seen as somewhat of an abstraction. 308 Indeed, the close reader may say, although this structure is consistent in and of itself, it is merely that-a structure without substance. 309 I will concede that, at least in its initial outlines, that such criticism 303 See supra note 294. 304 As a matter of optics, the "double negative" is written in shorthand as "Gatekeeper Negative / Corporation Negative."
305 This "mixed" interest circumstance is noted as "Gatekeeper Negative / Corporation Positive." 306 Accordingly, this "mixed" circumstance carries the label "Gatekeeper Positive / Corporation Negative."
307 This final quadrant is described as "Gatekeeper Positive / Corporation Positive." 308 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 93 (1986) ("[W]e might understand law better if we could find a similar abstract description of the point of law most legal theorists accept so that their arguments take place on the plateau it furnishes. Neither jurisprudence nor my own arguments later in this book depend on finding an abstract description of that sort.") 309 See id.
has some merit. 310 Nevertheless, it is in bringing substance to such a form that we may more intensely consider the theoretical foundations of conflicts rules. 311 And when applying the aforementioned categorization to such a substance, the following illustration comes into view:
Figure 2: Comparison of Categorized Conflicts Rules
contrast, the corporation will understandably be reluctant to make such disclosure because it will bring to light an otherwise hidden wrong. 318 But what then of the lower right hand quadrant? Here, I will argue, is where ethical rules lie. For it is in the clear interest of the gatekeeper to maintain her status within the market as a professional, and in so doing she must uphold the stated ethical requirements of her chosen profession. 319 Further, the corporation seeks the services of the gatekeeper precisely because she is a professional-she provides a specialized service that the corporation cannot obtain solely on its own. 320 Ethical rules are, in this sense, a necessity for both the gatekeeper and the corporation. 321 As a consequence, ethical rules occupy a primary position within the constellation of conflicts rules.
322 This is not to say, of course, that activity rules, liability rules and disclosure rules have no relevance when assessing conflicts of interest rules within the ambit of corporate and securities law. 323 Quite the contrary-such rules must always be considered by the rule maker when considering possible alternatives in federal securities law and regulation. 324 But it must first begin with the ethical rules. For without the ethical rules, the entire structure of gatekeeper enforcement in the various professions will collapse like so many houses of cards. 325 The primacy of ethical rules, therefore, obtains in the context of corporate and securities law where the gatekeeper is an actor.
326
The Corporate Gatekeeper in Ethical Perspective
If we may then agree that ethical rules, properly considered, occupy a primary position within the various categories of conflicts rules, what ethical rule should be under consideration in the present state of affairs in corporate and securities law? 327 Here, I will argue that an ethical perspective within the context of corporate and securities law is necessary. 328 More specifically, by providing additional legal rules that will build upon the notion of an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper, the landscape within corporate and securities law may, hopefully, improve for the better. 329 And in facilitating the process by which the gatekeeper thinks, considers and reflects upon her actions, the intention is that better decisions will ultimately be made. 330 Although one can imagine a host of potential changes in law that will build upon this notion of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper, for the present discussion perhaps a more tentative proposal will suffice. 331 Here, I have in mind the proposed rules on Compensation Committee independence standards as part of the DoddFrank reforms.
332 If the effort is to facilitate an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper, then perhaps encouraging such an approach by means of the disclosure rules may be a helpful way to start. 333 Specifically, by including such language into the proposed rule that will highlight the importance of the corporate gatekeeper from an ethical perspective, the process whereby such gatekeeper more fully considers the issue of conflicts of interest may be facilitated. 334 Indeed, one can imagine that careful consideration of conflicts already takes within the practice of law. 335 For instance, imagine a partners' meeting at a leading law firm in the United States. 336 Assume, for the moment, that a potential engagement raises a conflict of interest. At some point, the discussion may turn to the questions-do we really want to take on this representation? Is this who we are? How will this affect our reputation? And if such discussion already takes place within the practice of law, 334 See generally Dodd-Frank § 952. In this sense, the action-that is, the manifested behavior-of the professional qua gatekeeper can be constructed in such fashion as to constitute a formality of sorts. See Fuller, supra note 207 at 805 ("Forms must be reserved for relatively important transactions. We must preserve a proportion between means and end; it will scarcely do to require a sealed and witnessed document for the effective sale of a loaf of bread.") Although the focus of the discussion will likely then turn to the nature and quality of the formality in question, the specifics of any such formality will undoubtedly be subject to the political process. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 44. Nevertheless, one senses that-as a matter of legal theory-the key move in the extended discussion of doctrine will have been made. The question, therefore, will become one of competing formalities. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 (chief executive officer and chief financial officer certification of financial statements of reporting companies). 335 For instance, a review of the proxy materials for the 30 public companies that are the components of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from the 2011 proxy season indicates that the term "reputation" is used by 20 companies as part of their codes of ethics disclosure. See, e.g., Review of Selected 2011 Proxy Statements: Dow Component Companies for the 2011 Proxy Season, Sept. 15, 2011 (on file with author); see generally Sarbanes-Oxley § 406. While such data is by no means dispositive in a strict sense, this does suggest that the reputational effects associated with conflicts of interest issues is an important consideration in the corporate boardroom. My thanks to Priti Nemani for her assistance in obtaining these findings. 336 See, e.g., Rhode and Hazard, supra note 185, at 32-35. 337 Within the practice of law, this brief hypothetical will admittedly be much more complex. For instance, one imagines that the respective ethical concerns for actors within the law firm will be quite different. Senior Partner W with equity in the firm will stand in a different position from Junior Partner X, who may have little or no equity at all. Further, Senior Associate Y may have a different perspective than should not the applicable federal regulations further encourage such consideration of conflicts as a matter of ethical rule? 338 The potential benefits of such encouragement can be seen as four-fold: (i) the relevant profession will more proactively address matters of conflicts of interest through individual cases; 339 (ii) the professional qua gatekeeper will be reminded of the importance of preserving her reputational capital; 340 (iii) a potential collective action problem will be addressed in that an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper will be universal applied to the gatekeepers in question; 341 and (iv) the normative ends of justice, such as they are, may be more fully achieved by focusing the attention of both the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client. 342 In taking such steps to facilitate introspection by the professional qua gatekeeper, we may then achieve some measure of consideration of ethical rules in the difficult case. 343 While it is far from clear that this will in fact occur, at the least the law will have provided an additional method by which such consideration may take place-from an ethical perspective. 344 And the specific manner in which such consideration takes place will be in the assessment by the professional qua gatekeeper of her reputation-that fleeting thing that takes 20 years to build and five minutes to ruin.
345
IV. CONCLUSION
The classification of conflicts of interest remains one of the enduring challenges in Junior Associate Z; however, one supposes that both will stand in a different position from legal assistants and staff who are not subject to rules of professional ethics in connection with state bar licensure requirements. Moreover, the respective risk to reputation as opposed to opportunity of an optimum of professional performance-that is to say, a "happy" client-will necessarily be different for attorneys within the law firm, given their level of involvement in the relevant case or transaction. Thus, an attorney with no part in an engagement that subsequently ruins the reputation of the firm in five minutes, will in this sense lose the reputation of the firm that she may have helped build over 20 years. Here, recall the accounting fraud scandals-Enron, Worldcom and the rest-as well as the most notable instances from the financial crisis-Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, etc. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1 at 34-38. In the case of the large firm, therefore, this asymmetry of reputational effects will be an important issue to consider as a matter of firm governance and, more broadly, by the professions as a matter of their self-regulation. Myboth corporate law and legal ethics in that it raises fundamental questions as to the proper role of the professional qua gatekeeper. 346 And while such a classification can never truly be complete, 347 an attempt to consider the ethical implications of such conflicts does, in a certain sense, engage with both the burdens and responsibilities of professional practice. 348 As the Model Rules note in their Preamble on a Lawyer's Responsibilities:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system. 349 The foregoing discussion of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper, as a matter of logic, hopefully furthers the discussion on the professional, ethical and moral dilemmas that may be encountered by the professional in practice. 350 And in its prescription for possible revisions to proxy disclosures rules 351 -that is, ethical rules of the second-order-one may then begin to reconsider the corporate gatekeeper from the perspective of those rules prescribed by the professions themselves-that is to say, ethical rules of the first-order.
